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This paper aims to examine the Indonesian experiences with the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis 
and the 2008/09 global economic crisis. It has three main parts. The first part gives a theoretical 
explanation of the main transmission channels through which the two crises have affected the 
Indonesian economy. It also provides a list of key indicators of these types of economic crises. 
The second part is the empirical part about the impacts of the crises on economic growth, 
employment, remittances and poverty in Indonesia. One important finding from this study is that 
the Indonesian economy was much more resilient to the last crisis as compared to the first 
crisis. During the first crisis, Indonesian economic growth was negative and poverty increased 
significantly; whereas during the second one, Indonesia managed to keep a positive economic 
growth rate (though declined), and poverty kept declining. The third part provides a list of main 
reasons for the difference, and sound banking sector after the first crisis is among the list.       
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Indonesia  now  is  much  more  vulnerable  to  any 
economic  shock  than,  say,  30  years  ago,  for  the 
following  reasons.  First,  since  economic  reforms 
started  in  the  1980s  toward  trade,  banking, 
investment,  and  capital  account  liberalizations,  the 
Indonesian  economy  has  become  more  integrated 
with  the  world  economy.  Second,  though  at  a 
decreasing  rate,  Indonesia  is  still  dependent  on 
exports of many primary commodities, i.e. mining and 
agriculture.  This  means  that  its  economy  is  still 
sensitive  to  any  world-price/demand  instability  for 
those  commodities.  Third,  Indonesia  has  become 
increasingly  dependent  on  imports  of  a  number  of 
food items such as rice, food grains, cereals, wheat, 
corn, meat, dairy, vegetables and fruits, or even oil. 
Any increases or instabilities of world prices or world 
production failures of these commodities will have big 
effects on domestic consumption and food security in 
Indonesia.  Fourth,  more  of  the  Indonesian  working 
population, including women, went abroad as migrant 
workers,  and  hence  livelihoods  in  many villages  in 
Indonesia  have  become  increasingly  dependent  on 
remittances from abroad. Any economic crisis hit the 
host countries (such as happened in Dubai during its 
financial  crisis  in  2009)  will  hit  the  Indonesian 
economy too. Finally, as a huge populated country 
with  increasing  income  per  capita,  domestic  food 
consumption  is  not  only  high  but  it  also  keeps 
increasing. Accelerating output growth in agriculture 
is therefore a must for Indonesia, and this depends 
on  various  factors,  including  climate,  which  is  an 
exogenous factor. As Indonesia is located between 
the Pacific ocean and the Indian ocean in the line of 
equator,  the  country  is  always  vulnerable  to  El 
Nino/La Nina phenomenon which may cause failures 
in  rice  (and  other  commodities)  harvest    and 
therefore will generate a hyperinflation. 
In  the past  12  years,  Indonesia  has experienced 046    E. J. Bus. Manage. Econ. 
 
 
   
                 
 















































two  economic  crises,  i.e.  the  Asian  financial  crisis 
started by mid. 1997 and reached its peak in 1998, 
and  the  global  economic  crisis  in  2008  and  2009. 
This  paper  aims  to  examine  the  Indonesian 
experiences with these two crises. It addresses two 
key questions. First, what were the main transmission 
channels through which the two crises affected the 
Indonesian economy. Second, was the impact on the 
Indonesian  economy  different  between  the  two 
crises, and if yes, what made the difference?  
The paper has three main parts. The first part gives 
a  theoretical  explanation  on  the  main  transmission 
channels through which the two crises have affected 
the Indonesian economy. The second part examines 
empirically  the  impacts  of  the  two  crises  on  the 
Indonesian economy focusing on economic growth, 
export,  employment,  remittances  and  poverty.  The 
third part gives the most likely reasons that made the 
impact of the 1997/98 crisis different than that of the 
2008/09 crisis.    
 
 
Main Transmission Channels  
 
The 1997/98 Crisis 
 
In Indonesia, the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis was 
triggered by a sudden capital flight from the country 
which led its national currency, rupiah, to depreciate 
significantly against the US dollar. 
iThe depreciation 
was soon followed by a national banking crisis and 
ended up as a national economic crisis (Rajan 2001). 
Thus, for Indonesia, the 1997/98 crisis was initialy a 
currency crisis. Theoretically, its direct impact would 
be mainly on Indonsian export and import (Figure 1). 
iiBy  assuming  other  factors  constant,  Indonesian 
export,  and  hence,  production,  employment  and 
income  in  its  exporting  firms/sectors  and  in  their 
backward  as  well  as  forward  linked  firms/sectors 
would  increase,  and  poverty  would  decline.  This  is 
the  “export-side  effect”  of  a  currency 
depreciation(Talvi  1997;  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  1995; 
Obstfeld  1986,  1996,  1997;  Kenen  1996;  Krugman 
1979, 1996; Radelet and Sachs 1998a,b; World Bank 
1998; Berg 1999; Rajan 2001).
iii  
On  the  import  side,  domestic  prices  of  imported 
consumption  and  non-consumption  goods  will  also 
increase. In the case of non-consumption goods (i.e. 
raw  materials,  capital  and  intermediate  goods, 
components/spare  parts),  as  a  response  to  higher 
prices (in national currency) of these imported goods, 
two scenarios are possible: (1) imports decline and, 
consequently,  total  domestic  production  and 
employemnt would drop, and poverty would grow;  or 
(2)  imports  may  stay  constant,  but,  consequently,  
domestic production cost would increase and finally it 
would lead to higher domestic inflation and more  
poverty. This is the “import-side effect” of a currency 
depreciation. 
The rupiah depreciation would also make the value 
in rupiah of foreign debts (in foreign currency against 




firms to rise. Many highly foreign indebted domestic 
firms would face a serious financial crisis. If many of 
them  have  to  reduce  their  production  or  even 
collapse, domestic total production and employment 
would then further decline, and more poverty as the 
result . This can be called as the foreign loan cost-
side effect of a currency depreciation.
iv 
During  the  crisis,  domestic  interest  rate  also 
increased significantly as the result of the Indonesian 
monetary authority’s direct response to  stop capital 
flight and rupiah to fall further. Theoretically, higher 
interest  rate  would  reduce  credit  demand  on  one 
hand,  and,  increase  non-performing  loan  (NPL)  of 
highly  indebted  firms,  on  the  other  hand.  The 
increase in total number of domestic firms with high 
NPL  together  with  bank  panic  would  make  the 
banking sector to collapse and credit scarce. So, the 
combination  of  the  rupiah  depreciation  and  the 
banking  collapse  (caused  by  higher  interest  rate) 
would  hit  not  only  higly import-depending firms  but 
also  high  bank  loans-depending  firms. Further,  this 
would lead to domestic inflation, unemployment, and 
increase  in  poverty.  This  can  be  called  as  the 
“domestic loan cost-effect” of a currency depreciation 
(Tambunan,  2010;  Corsetti  1998;  Corsetti  et  al. 
1999a,b, 2001; Chinn and Kletzer 2000).
v     
Thus, with the many possibilities that can happen 
as  a  result  of  currency  depreciation  as  explained 
above, the overall net impact of a national currency 
depreciation  on  poverty  can  be  thus  positive, 
negative  or  even  no  effect  at  all.  It  would  depend 
much on whether the export-side effect (positive) is 
larger, equal to or smaller than the combination of the 
import-,foreign  loan  cost-,  and  domestic  loan  cost-
side effects (negative) of the depreciation. The key 
issue  here  is  the  response  in  the  export-side.  The 
question is that when the rupiah is weakening, would 
export  increase  significantly  that  it  can 
overcompensate the negative import- and loan costs-
side effects. The answer is that it would depend at 
least  on  two  main  factors.  First,  the  proportion  of 
imported  inputs  in  the  export  products,  because  it 
would  determine  to  what  extent  the  price 
competitiveness of the products would increase when 
rupiah  depreciates.  Second,  domestic  production 
capacity  of  the  export  goods,  which  determines  to 
what extent the production would increase when their 
price competitiveness increases (Tambunan,2010).  
 
 
The 2008/09 Crisis 
 
The  2008/2009  crisis  has  been  called  by  many 
economists as the most serious economic or financial 
crisis since the great depression in the 1930s. The 
crisis  impacted  many  countries  through  various 
channels:   exports,    investment   (including   foreign  




direct  investment/FDI)  and  remittances  (Chhibber  et 
al.,  2009;  Griffith-Jones  and  Ocampo  2009;  IDS  2009).
 
viHowever, for Indonesia and many other developing 
countries  the  most  important  channel  was  export. 
Retrenchments  mounted  in  many  export-oriented 
manufacturing firms in these countries, while working 
time fell along with increased downward pressure on 
wages. Also many employees in these firms were laid 
off and many of them migrated back to rural areas 
and shifted to informal and vulnerable employment. 
For  Indonesia  and  most  other  affected  countries, 
the 2008/09 crisis was therefore considered primarily 
as  a  world  demand/export  market  crisis. 
Theoretically, as illustrated in Figure 2, this kind of 
shock would affect the economy of these countries at 
the first stage through its effects on domestic export-
oriented firms. It leads further to less production and 
employment in these firms and in other related firms. 
The  employment  reduction  causes  decline  in 
incomes  of  many  households  and  it  would  result 
further  in  lower  market  demands  for  goods  and 
services  and  hence  production  cuts  in  many 
industries/sectors.  Finally,  unemployment  and 
poverty would increase (Tambunan,2010).  
In large countries like Indonesia which consists of 
many islands or regions (i.e. provinces, districts and 
subdistricts), the impact may vary by region, or even 
the impact in some regions within the country may be 
more severe than at the national level. For instance, 
if the decline in average household income in Java 
island  (where  most  export-oriented  manufacturing 
industries are located) is higher than that in the rest 
of  the  country  and  the  proportion  of  the  affected 
households  in  Java  is  significantly large,  then  total 
income in Java would decline faster than that in the 
rest of the country, ceteris paribus.  
By assuming that other factors do not change, if 
remittance inflows to Java from foreign countries also 
affected by the crisis also decline, then the income in 
Java  would  drop  further.  If  remittances  to  other 
regions outside Java also decline, then the national 
income or the economic growth rate would decrease. 
In other words, if only one region in Indonesia was 
affected by the crisis and the region’s economy is not 
significantly important to the national economy based 
on  gross  domestic  products  (GDP)  distribution  by 
region,  the  effect  at  the  national  level  might  be 
insignificant,  even  if  the  impact  in  that  particular 
region was significant. On the other hand, if Java is 
the  highest  Indonesia’s  GDP  contributor,  even  a 
small impact of the crisis on Java would produce a 
serious shock for the national economy.  
Thus,  depending  on:  (1)  the  importance  of  the 
affected  export  commodities  in  Indonesia’s  total 
export;  (2)  the  importance  of  the  commodities  and 
their related sectors (through backward and forward 
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origin; (3) the importance of the regions’ economy in 
the  Indonesian  economy;  and  (4)  the  crisis-coping 
measures taken by the affected firms to mitigate the 
effect  of  the  crisis,  the  impact  or  outcome  of  the 
2008/09 crisis on the Indonesian economy and hence 
poverty  can  be  large  or  small.  Therefore,  as  an 
analytical  approach,  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on 
Indonesia’s  economy  and  poverty  should  be 
examined  by  analysing  the  followings:  (a)  export 
commodities which have been hit by the crisis; (b) 
regions/provinces  where  those  commodities  are 
concentrated; (c) linkages of those commodities with 
the rest of the economy; and (d) types of workers and 
their  households  who  are  mostly  affected  in  those 
agricultural  subsectors  and  in  those  regions  in 
general.  
However,  since  there  is  no  data  on  Indonesian 
export commodities by region/province and especially 
no  information  about  economic  linkages  between 
commodities  and  other  regional  sectors,  the  above 
proposed analytical approach can not be carried out 
in this study.  
SUMMARY 
 
From the above discussion, Table 1 summarizes the 
key  transmission  channels  through  which  the 
1997/98 and 2008/09 crises affected the Indonesian 
economy. With respect to the 1997/98 crisis, the key 
transmission  channels  through  which  the  crisis 
affected  the  Indonesian  economy  were  changes  in 
total exports and imports and in total rupiah costs of 
domestic and foreign debts. Regarding its impact on 
poverty,    the  next  transmission  channels  were 
changes  in  employment,  income  and  inflation  rate. 
Since the banking sector collapsed and interest rate 
increased  during  the  crisis  period  (as  discussed 
before),  changes  in  credit  and  interest  rate  should 
also  be  considered  as  transmission  channels. With 
respect  to  the  2008/09  crisis,  the  key  transmission 
channels were changes in total exports, remittances, 
output, and employment or income.  
Regarding  the  time  that  the  effect  reveals,  the 
channels can be ranked as the first channel (*), that 




Table 1: Main Transmission Channels of the Effects of the 1997/98 and 2008/09 Economic Crises 
 





















World demand/export crisis 









Table 2: Main Indicators of the 1997/98 Crisis and 2008/09 Crisis 
 
Type of crisis  Main Indicators  
Currency crisis (1997/98)  Export by sector and region 
Import by sector and region 
Domestic loans by sector and region 
Foreign loans by sector and region 
Output by sector and region 
Empoyment by sector and region 
Household income by sector and region 
Poverty by region 
Export crisis (2008/09)  Export by sector and region 
Output by sector and region 
Empoyment by sector and region 
Household income by sector and region 
Remittances by region 




channel (**), i.e. the second effect revealed after the 
first  one,  and  the  third  channel  (***),  and  so  on. 
However, when an economic crisis occurs its effects 
may  take  place  through  more  than  one  channels 
simultanously,  depending  on type  of the  crisis.  For 
example,  the  currency  crisis  has  two  first 
transmission  channels  simultanously  namely  export 
and import: when rupiah is depreciating, theretically, 
both  export  and  import  would  change  directly  and 
simultanously.   
 
 
Key Indicators  
 
An economic crisis has  not only main transmission 
channels, but also main indicators for monitoring the 
impacts of the crisis. Table 2 provides lists of main 
indicators for each of the two crises. For the 1997/98 
crisis which was a currency crisis, the main indicators 
are export and import (in volume or value), costs of 
loans  in  rupiah  from  both  domestic  and  foreign 
sources, output (volume or value), total employment 
(or unemployment), household incomes, and poverty. 
These are also the main indicators for the 2008/09 
crisis which was a world demand or an export crisis, 
but  without  costs  of  loans  and  with  one  extra 
indicator, namely total remittances. Since the impact 
of an economic crisis on domestic economy may vary 
by region and sector, all indicators should therefore 
be  based  on  disaggregated  data  by  region  (e.g. 
province,  district  or  subdistrict)  and  sector  (e.g. 






Figure 3: Indonesian GDP Growth rate during the 1997/1998 Crisis  






Figure 4: Development of Indonesian Income per Capita during the 1997/98 Crisis Period (US dollar).  




Empirical Analysis of the Impacts  
 
The 1997/98 Crisis 
 
The 1997/98 crisis hit many countries especially in 
East  and  Southeast  Asia  including  Indonesia, 
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and South 
Korea.  However,  the  impact  varied  by  country. 
Indonesia together with South Korea were among the 
most  severely  affected  ones.  The  Indonesian 
economy had plunged into a deep recession in 1998 
with overall growth at minus 13.7 per cent (Figure 3). 
The worst declines were in the construction sector (-
39.8 per cent), financial sector (-26.7 per cent), trade, 
and  hotel  and  restaurant  (-18.9  per  cent).  Other 
sectors,  which  had  large  contractions,  were 
manufacturing  (-12.9  per  cent)  and  transport  and 
communication  (-12.8  per  cent).    Mining  and  other 
services sectors experienced a contraction of about 
4.5 per cent.  The agricultural and utility sectors still 
experienced  positive  growth  at  about  0.2  per  cent 
and 3.7 per cent respectively (Feridhanusetyawan, et 
al., 2000). The crisis also led to a significant drop in 
income  per  capita  (Figure  4)  and  a  significant 
increase in poverty rate (Figure 5). All this evidence 
may suggest that the rupiah depreciation was more 
negative  rather  than  positive  for  the  Indonesian 
economy (Tambunan, 2010).  
The increase in poverty and the decline in income 
per capita were consistent with output contractions in 
many sectors as expained before. There were three 
main  reasons  why  the  rupiah  depreciation  had 
caused  a  serious  decline  in  Indonesia’s  aggregate 
output.  First,  despite  the  fact  that  Indonesia  had 
adopted  an  import  substitution  strategy  during  the 
New Order era (1966-1998) Indonesia, especially the 
manufacturing  industrty,  has  been  increasingly 
dependent  on  imported  capital  and  intermediate 
goods,  components  and  spareparts  and  some 










prevented  many  export-oriented  firms  from  gaining 
better  world  price  competitiveness,  while,  on  the 
other hand, many domestic market-oriented firms had 
to  close  down  or  to  cut  their  production  volume 
because  they  could  not  purchase  any  more  very 
expensive  imports.  Second,  many  firms,  expecially 
conglomerates, during that era had borrowed  a lot 
money  from  foreign  capital  markets;  mostly  were 
short-term  loans.  They  went  bankrupt  when  rupiah 
depreciated  and  many  other  firms  which  had 
business  relations  with  them  were  also  in  serious 
trouble. Third, the national banking sector was also 
collapsed.  By  the  end  of  1997  a  total  of  16 
commercial banks were closed down, and access to 
credit  then  became  very  difficult  and  interest  rate 
increased  significantly.  This  has  contributed 
significantly  to  output  contractions  in  many  sectors  
(Tambunan, 2010).  
There  is  some  evidence  that  the  crisis  not  only 
increased poverty but also reduced  the quality and 
supply of education and health services. Chhibber et 
al., (2009) report that the crisis decreased enrolment 
rates among children aged 8-13 years and increased 
enrolment  rates  among  children  aged  14-19  years, 
although these changes were small, just about one 
percentage point of enrolment. The impact on school 
enrolment, however, varied by region suggesting that 
different  regions  in  the  country  may  have 
experienced  it  differently  with  the  crisis.  Another 
important  study  is  a  1999  report  issued  by  the 
Australian  Agency  for  International  Development 
(AusAID).  It  shows  that  the  crisis  had  numerous 
adverse  health  impacts  in  Indonesia,  including:  (1) 
declines  in,  respectively,  personal  and  government 
expenditures  on  primary  care.  The  use  of  health 
services for primary care also declined; (2) decline in 
purchases  of  medicines;  (3)  declines  in  DTP3 
immunization  rates  and  polio  rates.  Vitamin  A 
supplementation  also  fell.  The  declines  most  likely 
occurred among the poorer populations; (4) decline in 
the  lowest  wealth  quintile  in  child  visits  to  health 
facilities; (5) a halt in the 1990s downward trend in 




The 2008/09 Crisis 
 
Up  to  the  end  of  2008,  countries  like  Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia  still 
showed some resilience towards the crisis. However 
in  the  first  quarter  of  2009,  they  experienced 
deteriorating  economic  performance,  except 
Indonesia  (Figure  6).  Singapore  suffered  the  most 
and recorded -8.9 per cent in real GDP growth rate 
(year-on-year basis) in the first quarter of 2009. This 
was  not  surprising,  given  the  fact  that  as  a  small 
economy, Singapore is fully integrated with the global 
market  for  goods,  services  and  finance. 
Consequently, its  economy is fully  sensitive  to  any 
external  economic  shocks.  The  country’s  economy 
then started to recover with positive growth again in 
the  third  quarter.  Similarly  with  Singapore  was 
Thailand  which  has  also  been  seriously  hit  by  the 
crisis  since  the  third  quarter  of  2008  and  the 
economy  contracted  by  7.11  per  cent  in  the  first 
quarter  of  2009.  Thailand  achieved  again  positive 
growth  in  the  last  quarter  of  2009.  Malaysia  which 
experienced a slightly positive growth of around 0.1 






Figure 6: Economic Growth Rate in Selected ASEAN member countries, 2008 and 2009 (% change year-on-year)   






Figure 7: Indonesian Annual Economic Growth 2004-2009 (%)   




economic  contraction  by  6.20  per  cent  in  the  first 
quarter  of  2009.  Meanwhile,  Indonesia  and  the 
Philippines managed to keep positive growth though 
at declining rates during the crisis period. In the first 
quarter  of  2009  Indonesia  achieved  6.2  per  cent 
growth, but in the last quarter it was lower at 5.2 per 
cent.  
While the economy of other countries in the group 
was  deteriorated  significantly  especially  during  the 
first months in 2009, Indonesia has not only positive 
but also slightly higher GDP growth rates during the 
second  and  third  quarters  of  2009.  In  overall, 
however,  official  data  (National  Agency  of 
Statistics/BPS)  show  that  the  growth  rate  of 
Indonesian  economy  was  at  around  4.5  percent, 
much lower than the growth rate achieved in 2008 
(Figure  7).  This  may  suggest  that  the  Indonesian 
economy was also affected by the  world economic 
recession  in  2008/09,  but  nevertheless  the  country 
was  able  to  keep  postive  economic  growth  rates 
during the crisis period.  
Further  as  shown  in  Table  3,  besides  Indonesia, 
there  were  other  few  countries  in  the  region  e.g. 
China,  India,  Pakistan  and  Bangladesh  which  also 
managed to mitigate the impact of the crisis on their 
domestic economy. Interestingly, the table shows that 
within the developing world, countries in Asia and the 
Pacific region performed much better than those in 
other parts of the world during the crisis. Of course, 




Table 3: Economic Growth in the Developing World by Region, 2007-2009 
 
Region  2007  2008  2009 
East Asia and Pacific  11.4  8.0  6.8 
-PRC  13.0  9.0  8.4 
-Indonesia  6.3  6.2  4.5 
-Thailand  4.9  2.2  -2.7 
Europe and Central Asia   7.1  4.2  -6.2 
South Asia  8.5  5.7  5.7 
-India  9.1  6.1  6.0 
-Pakistan  5.7  2.0  3.7 
-Bangladesh  6.4  6.2  5.9 
Latin America and Caribbean  5.5  3.9  -2.6 
Middle East and North Africa  5.9  4.3  2.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  6.5  5.1  1.1 
 






Figure 8: Total Number of Indonesian Overseas Workers, 2000-2008 (000 persons)  
Source: Yudo et al.(2009) 
 
 
the variation  in the  impact  of this  kind  of  crisis  on 
domestic economy is strongly related to the degree of 
integration  of  the  particular  country  with  the  world 
economy.  Rapidness  and  effectiveness  of  crisis-
coping  policy  measures  in  the  partuicular  country 
may also have played an important role.   
With  respect  to  remittances,  according  to  ILO 
(2009) the number of Indonesian workers abroad had 
been on an upward trend until the crisis deepened in 
mid  2009.  Yugo  et  al.,  (2009)  provide  data  which 
show  that  the  number  of  Indonesian  workers  that 
departed  overseas  increased  with  258,000  workers 
by the end of December 2008 or around 54 percent 
as  compared  to  the  end  of  September  2008  with 
168,000  workers.  However,  the  total  Indonesian 
workers  tat  went  abroad  in  2008  was  less  than  in 
2007 (Figure 8). However, according to Yugo, et al., 
(2009)  estimation,  total  remittances  inflows  from 
overseas  Indonesian  workers  declined  slightly  to 
approximately  US$1.589  billion  in  the  end  of  first 
quarter  of  2009  from  US$1.61  billion  in  December 
2008.    It  is  not  sure  whether  the  less  number  of 
Indonesian  overseas  workers  in  2008  compared  to 
2007 or the slight decline in remittances inflows was 
caused by the crisis? 
With  respect  to  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on 
employment,  according  to  ADB  (2009),  
unemployment  in  many  Asian  developing  countries 
increased during the 2008/09 crisis, particularly in the 






Figure 9: Number of Laid off and homed workers in the formal sector, 31 December 2008-4 December 2009  










China;  Singapore;  and  Taipei,China.  In  Indonesia, 
the number of workers dismissal and homed in the 
formal  sector  steadily  increased  during  end 
December  2008  and  early  December  2009  (Figure 
9).  While,    according  to  ILO  (2009),  the  crisis 
prompted  a  steep  fall  in  the  growth  of  wage 
employment, which grew by about 1.4 percent during 
the  period  of  February  2008-February  2009, 
compared to 6.1 percent during the same period in 
the previous year.  
But,  surprisingly,  open  unemployment  has  not 
increased significantly in that period. Even, it declined 
between  February-August  2009  (Figure  10).  One 
explanation  is  that  Indonesia  has  a  large  informal 
sector which absorbed laid-off employees from crisis-
affected firms in the formal sector. In other words, the 
impact of the crisis on Indonesia’s labour market was 
not the significant increase in open employment but 
in  disguised  unemployment  working  in the  informal 
sector. 
Finally,  the  impact  of  the  crisis  on  poverty  in 
Indonesia  was  the  most  concern  in  that  time.  As 
shown before, in the aftermath of the 1997/98 crisis, 
poverty increased dramatically from around 17.47 per 
cent in 1996 to about 24.23 per cent in 1998, when 








Number of Poor (million)  Percentage of poverty (%) 
Urban  Rural  Total  Urban  Rural  Total 
2000  12.30  26.40  38.70  14.60  22.38  19.14 
2001  8.60  29.30  37.90  9.76  24.84  18.41 
2002  13.30  25.10  38.40  14.46  21.10  18.20 
2003  12.20  25.10  37.30  13.57  20.23  17.42 
2004**  11.40  24.80  36.10  12.13  20.11  16.66 
2005**  12.40  22.70  35.10  11.68  19.98  15.97 
2006*  14.49  24.81  39.30  13.47  21.81  17.75 
2007*  13.56  23.61  37.17  12.52  20.37  16.58 
2008*  12.77  22.19  34.96  11.65  18.93  15.42 
2009*  .11.91  .20.62  .32.53  .10.72  .17.35  14.15 
2010*  .11.10  19.93  31.02  .9.87  16.56  13.33 
2011*  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  12.49 
 




poverty started to decline gradually, though first very 
slightly up to 2005. In 2006 due to the high increase 
in  world  fuel  prices  and  as  Indonesia  has  become 
increasingly dependent on imports of oil, the poverty 
rate  increased  again  on  average  between  1.8 
percentage point per year or about 4.2 million people 
fell into poverty between the period 2005-2006. Only 
after  some  policy  adjustments  and  macroeconomic 
stabilization, the poverty rate started to decline again 
in 2007. In relative terms, the poverty rate in 2007 
was  the  same  as  that  before  the  1997/98  crisis. 
However,  in  absolute  terms,  the  number  of  those 
living under the current poverty line was still higher 
than that in the pre-1997/98 crisis period. During the 
2008/09 crisis, poverty rate kept declining (Table 4), 
which may suggest that in overall the crisis did not 
have a negative impact on poverty in Indonesia (as 
compared to the 1997/98 crisis).  
 
 
Main Factors that Made the Difference 
 
By now it is well known that Indonesia was not only 
weathering the 2008/09 global economic crisis better 
than  most  other  countries,  but  it  was  also  much 
different  than  during  the  1997/98  Asian  financial 
crisis. The World Bank concludes the following: One 
year  after  the  global  financial  crisis  and  economic 
downturn,  Indonesia’s  economy  appears  to  be 
broadly  back  on  track.  Economic  activity  has  been 
picking up, inflation has remained moderate, financial 
markets  have  risen,  and  the  newly  reelected 
government,  having  established  the  strong 
fundamentals  that  supported  Indonesia  through  the 
global crisis, appears to be now gearing up for new 
investments  in  Indonesia’s  physical  infrastructure, 
human  services  and  institutions  of  state.  Indonesia 
seems  well-positioned  to  get  back  on  its  pre-crisis 
growth  trajectory,  with  the  possibility  of  further 
acceleration and more inclusive growth (World Bank, 
2009a).  
Was  the  difference  because  the  Indonesian 
government’s response this time was quickwe or was 
better  prepared  than  during  the  1997/98  crisis,  or 
were there other factors?  There are various reasons, 
and  the  most  important  ones  are  the  followings  ( 




From  a  regional  perspective,  the  Indonesian 
economy  performed  well  in  the  years  before  2008 
(with one of the best growth rates in Asia after the 
1997/98 Asian crisis up to 2008, particularly during 
the period 2005-2008); the banking sector remained 
in good health (which was not the case in the years 
before the 1997/98 Asian economic crisis), although 
bank lending growth reduced in line with the slowing 
economy; consumer prices kept stable, allowing the  
Indonesian central bank, Bank Indonesia, to loosen 
monetary  policy  (which  is  important  to  keep 
consumption  growth);  Indonesia’s  external  position 
remained  sound,  the  country’s  significant  external 
financing  obligations  are  being  met,  and  foreign 
exchange  reserves  have  risen  slightly;  Indonesia’s 
public finances are strong (which was not the case 
during  the  1997/98  Asian  crisis),  allowing  policy 
makers  to  quickly  move  to  offset  the  global 
downturn’s effects on Indonesia with a fiscal stimulus; 
also based on the experience of the 1997/98 crisis, 
cautious policies by Indonesia’s government, banks, 




resulted  in  low  debt  levels  and  limited  refinancing 
needs. This served the country especially well in late 
2008 and early 2009, when liquidity tightened around 
the  world;  compared  with  some  Asian  countries, 
Indonesia  is  a  relatively  “closed  economy”(  Djaja 
2009);
viii  consumers  kept  spending  despite  the  fact 
that banks tightened credits in late 2008. Much of this 
spending might also be linked to the election related 
activities;  and  based  on  the  experience  of  the 
1997/98  Asian  crisis,  this  time  the  Indonesian 
government was quick and more active in response 
with  appropriate  measures  to  the  crisis,  e.g.  by 
providing  the  stimulus  through  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies.  
While  the  main  reasons  given  by  the  Asian 
Development Bank, that made Indonesia was more 
resilience  than  other  countries  during  the  2008/09 
crisis are the followings (ADB, 2010b): the impact of 
a spike in risk aversion was muted by steady policy 
responses in Indonesia and the stabilising impact of 
co-ordinated  global  counter-measures  on  global 
financial  markets;  the  income  impact  of  the  fall  in 
commodity prices was mitigated by the fact that the 
preceding  years  had  seen  record  high  prices  for 
these same commodities, allowing rural households 
to build up a savings buffer to help them smoothen 
out consumption spending; the global recession was 
of relatively short duration, the lagged effects of the 
financial crisis were avoided; the government’s good 
housekeeping of previous years provided it with the 
space  to  take  swifter  and  more  effective  policy 
responses  than  in  previous  episodes  of  external 
shocks;  and  the  balance  sheets  of  the  banking, 






This study has examined the Indonesian experiences 
with  two  big  economic  crises  namely  the  1997/98 
Asian  financial  crisis  and  the  2008/09  global 
economic  crisis.  From  the  Indonesian  perspective, 
the 1997/98 crisis was significantly different from the 
2008/09 crisis: the first was initially a currency crisis, 
while  the  second  was  a  world  demand  crisis.  The 
study  comes  with  several  important  findings.  First, 
the Indonesian economy was much more resilient to 
the last crisis as compared to the first crisis. During 
the first crisis, the Indonesian economic growth was 
negative and poverty increased significantly; whereas 
during the second crisis, Indonesia managed to keep 
a  positive  economic  growth  rate  (though  declined), 
and poverty kept declining. There were a number of 
reasons, and among them were the sound banking 
sector  that  Indonesia  has  achieved  after  the  first 





economy in the years before 2008. 
Secondly,  despite  many  laid-off  workers  in  the 
formal  sector,  reported  during  the  2008/09  crisis 
period,  the  official  (open)  unemployment  has  not 
increased  significantly.  Even,  by  August  2009,  the 
rate  declined  compared  to  the  level  by  February 
2009.  The  most  possible  reason  for  this  was  that 
most (if not all) of the laid off employees ended up in 
economic activities in the informal sector, either es 
low-paid  workers  or  owners  of  micro  or  small 
businesses. This reason is most likely due to the fact 
that Indonesia does not have a social security system 
as  the  one  known  in  the  west  which  provides 
unemployment  benefits  to  those  who  have  none, 
while  looking  for  jobs.  Thus,  for  the  laid  off 
employees from the formal sector who were engaged 
in informal economic activities, they did that just as a 
means for them to survive. The informal sector has 
proved to be very important during the crisis as the 
last resort for them. 
Thirdly,  the  poverty  level  in  Indonesia  has  not 
increased  as  what  happened  during  the  1997/98 
crisis, when poverty rate increased from around 17.5 
per cent in 1996 to 24.2 per cent in 1998 with the 
negative economic growth at around 13 per cent in 
1998.  Even,  poverty  kept  decreasing  during  the 
2008/09 crisis period. At least, two main reasons that 
can explain this. First, despite the crisis, Indonesia 
managed  to  keep  a  positive  economic  growth  in 
2009, although at a lower rate than in 2008. In other 
words, although many employees were laid off in the 
formal  sector,  many  people  still  had  their  jobs. 
Second, as explained before, the informal sector has 
provided  alternative  income  sources  to  the  laid  off 
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iAs shown in Rajan (2001), the collapse of the rupiah and of other regional currencies such as the Thai bath and the Korean won 
was primarily caused by reversals in capital flows from the banking sector rather than by reversals in portfolio equity investments.  
II. 
iiOf  course  with  the  assumption  that  domestic  prices  (in  the  rupiah)  of  imported  goods  and  foreign  prices  (in  US  dollar)  of 
Indonesian exported goods are free to move (i.e. no fixed price regulation), the price elasticities of demands for import and export 
are non-zero, and other determinants of import and export are constant. For theoretical discussions of the impact of a currency 
depreciation/devaluation  on  trade  (export  and  import),  see,  among  many  others,  Talvi  (1997),  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1995), 
Obstfeld (1986, 1996, 1997), Kenen (1996), and Krugman (1979, 1996).       
III. 
iiiThe 1997/98 Asian financial crisis which was also known as the Southeast Asian currency crisis has inspired widespread interest 
in  currency-crisis  models  and  their  economic  policy  implications.  Since  the  crisis,  many  studies  have  been  done,  both  the 
descriptive  studies  about  the  crisis,  or  studies  about  individual-hit  Southeast  Asian  countries  like  Indonesia,  Thailand,  South 
Korea, and the Philippines. Among those studies are Radelet and Sachs (1998a,b), World Bank (1998), Berg (1999) and Rajan 
(2001).   
IV. 
ivTheoretically,  financial  condition  of  the  Indonesian  government  which  borrowed  a  lot  of  money  from  abroad  would  also 
deteriorate as rupiah depreciates. However, during the 1997/98 crisis,  the impact on domestic production and employment was 
not evident. Even, during the crisis the government could increase its expenditure on fuel, health and education to mitigate the 
impact of the crisis on the poor. A large part of the increased expenditure was from loans provided by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF),  
V. 
vSee  also such  as Corsetti  (1998),  Corsetti  et  al. (1999a,b, 2001)  and  Chinn  and Kletzer (2000) in  their  analyses  about  the 
significant importance of the banking collapse in determining the seriousness of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis.   
VI. 
1Since the crisis, many studies have been conducted with the aim to examine the likely impacts of the crisis on many countries, especially in the 
developing world. See for instance, Chhibber, et al. (2009),  Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2009), and IDS (2009).   
VII. 
viiSee also, World Bank, (2009b, 2010b) Djaja (2009), Zavadjil (2009), and ADB (2009, 2010a). 
VIII. 
viii In his study, Djaja (2009) shows that  the share of Indonesia’s exports to GDP was 29.4 per cent in 2007. The figure in the next 
three quarters of 2008 was 30.0 per cent on average. About 85 per cent of goods and services produced by Indonesian economy 
were used domestically in 2005, while only about 15 per cent went to foreign buyers. This indicates that Indonesia is not so 
strongly integrated with the rest of the world, at least from an export point of view. With such low exports, a sudden drop in world 
income and hence in world demand for Indonesian exports will not affect significantly domestic production. 
 
 
 